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Abstract
The paper presents a metaphysical characterization of spatiotemporal
backgrounds from a realist perspective. The conceptual analysis is based
on a heuristic sketch that encompasses the common formal traits of the ma-
jor spacetime theories, such as Newtonian mechanics and general relativity.
It is shown how this framework can be interpreted in a fully realist fashion,
and what is the role of background structures in such a picture. In the end it
is argued that, although backgrounds are a source of metaphysical discom-
fort, still they make a spacetime theory easy to interpret. It is also suggested
that this conclusion partially explains why the notion of background inde-
pendence carries a lot of conceptual difficulties.
Keywords: Background structure; spacetime theory; nomic necessity; dy-
namical sameness; principle of reciprocity; substantive general covariance;
background independence.
1 Introduction
Tempus absolutum, verum, & mathematicum, in se & natura sua sine
relatione ad externum quodvis, æquabiliter fluit [...] Spatium abso-
lutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet
similare & immobile [...]
(Newton, 1726, p. 6)
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Newtonian absolute space and time are the epitomes of background structures.
Newton’s definitions quoted above beautifully express the idea of a background
spatiotemporal structure as something whose characteristic properties are insensi-
tive to anything else. Such an idea is indeed straightforward but it is also a source
of conceptual discomfort. Starting from the Leibniz/Clarke debate on Newtonian
mechanics (NM), and continuing with the aether problem in classical electrody-
namics, it became clearer and clearer that the assumption of absolute structures
led to differences in the physical description that were not inherent in the phenom-
ena.
These conceptual problems justified a “war” on Newtonian backgrounds that ended
victoriously with general relativity (GR), which is quite uncontroversially con-
sidered the first spacetime theory that dispenses with background spatiotemporal
structures - i.e., it is background independent. However, despite the agreement
over the fact that GR is a background independent theory, an uncontroversial defi-
nition of this feature is still missing. Having in mind the extremely intuitive char-
acterization of background spatiotemporal structures in NM, we might frown upon
this difficulty. The definition of a background independent theory seems straight-
forward: it is just a theory where no (spatiotemporal) structure bears its properties
independently of anything else. Actually, things have proven much more diffi-
cult than this, as - for example - the discussion in Giulini (2007); Rickles (2008)
convincingly shows. The conceptual difficulties in spelling out what background
independence exactly amounts to lead not only to interpretational problems for
GR (think about the historical debate on the alleged “generalized” principle of
relativity initially proposed by Einstein), but also makes it difficult to extend this
framework to the quantum regime (see Rozali, 2009, for a technically accessible
introduction to the issue of background independence in quantum gravity).
The aim of this short essay is to contribute a reflection on the problem of back-
ground independence by revising the metaphysical characterization of spatiotem-
poral backgrounds under the light of modern spacetime physics. We will start
by providing a heuristic sketch that highlights the formal traits that are common,
at least, to the major spacetime theories such as NM, special relativity (SR), and
GR. We will then discuss a possible way to interpret this unified framework in a
straightforward manner, based on some minimal metaphysical commitments that
will be assumed as working hypotheses. Finally, we will exploit this conceptual
machinery to describe how a background structure would influence the physics
of possible worlds where background dependent theories hold. The hope is that,
from a metaphysical analysis of possible worlds might come some hint to develop
a better physical description of the actual one.
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2 A Primer on Spacetime Theories
In order to simplify our metaphysical analysis, let us start by providing a simple
formal sketch of a spacetime theory that is able to capture, albeit at a heuristic
level, the theoretical traits that are common to the most important spacetime theo-
ries.1 For simplicity’s sake, we agree that a physical theory can be formalized as a
set of relations between mathematical objects, and that each instantiation of such
relations - once suitably interpreted - represents a possible state of affairs.
Our main concern, at this stage, is to propose a theoretically ductile picture of
spacetime. The first step in this direction is to specify what the building blocks of
spacetime are. Again, to keep things simple, we will just say that these primitive
elements are called events. After a theory is interpreted, then such elements will
take a definite physical meaning, such as that of “place-at-a-time”, or “physical
coincidence”. Claiming that spacetime is a set of events M is for sure general,
but rather uninformative, which means that we need to add structure to it. The
second step is, then, to equip the set of events with a notion of “surroundings”.
This can be achieved by defining a new set M := (M, τ), which is nothing but
our starting set M together with a family τ of its subsets satisfying the following
requirements:
- The empty set and M itself belong to τ.
- Any union of arbitrarily many elements of τ is an element of τ.
- Any intersection of finitely many elements of τ is an element of τ.
τ is called a topology on M, and its elements are called open sets in M. A subset
V of M is a neighborhood for an element x ∈ M iff there exists an open set A ∈ τ
such that x ∈ A ⊆ V . Moreover, we require the elements of M to be topologically
distinguishable and separable, i.e. for any two elements x and y of M, there exists
a neighborhood U of x and a neighborhood V of y such that their intersection is the
empty set. In this way, we end up with a topological space M with a well-defined
criterion for judging whether any two events are numerically distinct or not.
The structure so defined over M is sufficient to introduce a notion of continuity
of a function, and this lets us apply a further constraint on the characterization
of spacetime, that is, the fact that, locally, it has to appear Euclidean. This con-
straint is implemented by requiring that for any open set A in M there exist a
function h : A → Rn that is bijective, continuous and whose inverse is continu-
ous. A function satisfying these conditions is called a homeomorphism. Roughly
speaking, this condition assures that, for any open set A of M, all elements in A
1The following sketch is based on Friedman (1983).
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can be labelled using a n-tuple of real numbers - which usually amounts to say-
ing that A admits a coordinatization {xi}i=0,...,n−1. Furthermore, we want that, for
each two coordinatizations on overlapping neighborhoods, the transition function
from one coordinatization to the other - which is entirely defined and acting on
R
n
- is differentiable in the ordinary sense. If we have shaped our spacetime ju-
diciously then, in general, to any coordinate transformation {xi} → {yi} defined in
a neighborhood A of M corresponds a map f : M → M such that, for each point
P in A, xi( f (P)) = yi(P). It can be proven that such a map, also called intrinsic
transformation, preserves the structure defined so far on M. The set of all these
structure-preserving transformations is nothing but the group di f f (M) of diffeo-
morphisms2 acting on M. The reader not much fond of technicalities can just
visualize di f f (M) as the group of permutations of elements of M that represent
smooth deformations of this space.
So far we have introduced some kind of “canvas” on which an even richer struc-
ture - consisting in a variety of geometrical objects - can be defined. The most
simple example is that of a (continuous) curve, which is represented by a (contin-
uous) map σ : I ⊆ R → M. In a given coordinate system {xi}, the curve acquires
the form xi = xi(t), t ∈ I. Another possibility is to define a field-theoretic object
Θ as a map from M to another space X: if X is a space of rank 2 tensors, then
Θ will be a tensor field on M whose components Θi j in a coordinate system {xi}
will be the elements of a n × n matrix. These geometrical objects can in general
be transformed by the application of a diffeomorphism. For example, if we have a
field Φ : M → X and we want to apply to this field a transformation f : M → M;
this is done by defining such “application” as f ∗Φ := Φ ◦ f which, for all x ∈ M,
means that ( f ∗Φ)(x) = Φ( f (x)). In case of a map γ : I → M, instead, we have
f ∗γ := f ◦ γ ⇒ ( f ∗γ)(y) = f (γ(y)) for all y ∈ Y. The fact that there is a
(nearly) one-to-one correspondence between coordinate transition functions and
diffeomorphisms allows us to switch from the coordinate language to the intrinsic
one without caring for any loss of information.
Among all the geometrical objects definable over M, there is a subgroup of them
that endow M with more structure than just its topology - indeed, they supply M
with a geometry properly said. The most important of these objects are the metric
tensor and the affine connection. The former is a rank-2 tensor g that is symmetric
(i.e. gi j = g ji in all coordinate systems) and non-degenerate (i.e. the determinant
det|gi j| of the matrix |gi j| is different from zero in all coordinate systems), and
which makes it possible to define the notion of “length” of a curve on M. The
latter is a derivative operator ∇ (also called covariant derivative) that provides a
precise meaning to the “change of direction” of a curve on M. Hence, for exam-
2That is, those mappings from M to itself which are bijective, continuous and differentiable
together with their inverses.
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ple, a curve that never changes direction is a straight line or affine geodesic on
M. Since also g permits to define a straight line as the curve of shortest length
between two points of M, we have also a notion of metric geodesic which, in
general, does not have to coincide with the affine one. For this reason, the con-
nection is required to be compatible with the metric tensor, i.e. it must always be
the case that ∇g = 0. Once we have a well-defined notion of straight line, we can
tell “how much” it corresponds to the usual straight line of Euclidean geometry;
this evaluation is made possible by the Riemann curvature tensor Riem[g]. If the
Riemann tensor is identically null all over the manifold, then the geodesics of M
are exactly those of Euclidean geometry, and we say that the spacetime is flat,
otherwise curved.
Let us now make some concrete cases. The first example is perhaps the simplest
one: the spacetime of special relativity (SR). This theory postulates a spacetime M
endowed with the Euclidean topology ofR4, that is, there exists a homeomorphism
mapping the entire manifold over R4. A metric tensor - the Minkowski metric η
- is defined over M. As expected this object takes the form of a 4 × 4 matrix in
whatever coordinate system. Moreover, it is always possible to find a coordinate
system where |ηi j| = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). The Minkowski metric is compatible with a
flat connection that basically overlaps with the usual derivative operator of differ-
ential calculus: this means that, in SR, the geodesics of M are the usual straight
lines of Euclidean geometry.
In NM, things are more complicated. We still have that M is globally homeo-
morphic to R4, but the geometric structure of the manifold is that of a bunch of
Euclidean 3-spaces piled together by a temporal 1-flow - more compactly we write
M = E3×R. In order to achieve this structure, we need to postulate a Euclidean 3-
metric over each 3-space plus a temporal metric that labels the succession of these
spaces. We then fix a flat connection compatible with this building and, finally,
we single out a particular class of straight lines that describes the trajectories of
bodies at absolute rest. This class of geodesics fix a notion of “sameness of place
through time”, while the temporal metric evaluates time intervals in a coordinate-
independent manner. In sum, this is the complicated machinery needed to depict
an absolute space enduring over absolute time.
Finally, in the case of GR, there is no restriction either on the topology of M, or
on the metric tensor g, or on the affine connection ∇. The only conditions are that
g and ∇ are compatible, and that M is Lorentzian, which means that it is always
possible to find a coordinate system {xi} on a neighborhood A of a point P ∈ M
such that exactly at that point g reduces to the Minkowski metric.
In technical terms, all the spacetimes described above are instances of a n-dimensional
(pseudo-)Riemannian manifold. In all cases we had n = 4, but in general nothing
prevents us from elaborating a theory where the manifold has higher dimension-
ality. In the Kaluza-Klein approach, for example, a further spatial dimension is
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added to spacetime, which hence is 5-dimensional.
As we have seen from the above examples, the way we fix all the features of M,
such as dimensionality, topology, geometry, or even further structures, varies from
theory to theory. Some theories fix ab initio just few features, and let the others
be dictated by the dynamics, while others presuppose from the outset rigid spa-
tiotemporal structures that are not influenced by the dynamics. Obviously, these
possible choices are relevant in determining whether a theory is background inde-
pendent or not, as it will become clear later.
Now that we have given a formal account of spacetime, we are ready to define a
spacetime theory in the following way:
Definition 1. (Spacetime theory) A spacetime theory T is a set of mathematical
relations E involving a set of geometrical objects O defined over a n-dimensional
Riemannian manifold M:
T = T (M,O;E).3 (1)
The power of (1) lies in the fact that this formal unification makes simpler to spell
out the way a spacetime theory is usually interpreted. M plus its additional ge-
ometrical structure is taken to be the spacetime properly called; a curve on M
describes the motion of a point-like particle (so it is called the worldline of that
particle), and a generic material field occupying a spacetime region A is repre-
sented by a map which assigns to each point in A a tensor (or a vector, or even
a scalar). Hence, spacetime is “decorated” by particles’ worldlines, which are
more or less straight depending on the near presence of material fields, such as
the electromagnetic one. If a field is able to bend the worldline of a particle and
the particle is able to modify the configuration of a field, then the two are said
to be interacting. All the possible interactions between physical objects and the
resulting motions allowed on M are expressed in terms of relations encoded in
E, which, in a given coordinate system, take the form of differential equations
involving the components of the geometrical objects. Here, as a working hypoth-
esis, we will stick to this simple reading, which presupposes a realistic attitude
towards the geometric objects of the theory. This means that we will consider all
the geometric objects in O as referring either to real (or at least possible) objects
or to properties born by them. Hence, for example, a curve on M will commit
us to the (possible) existence of point-like particles moving along that worldline.
Since, in general, the objects in O are field-theoretic in nature, we will be also
3Just to be fair, it is not the case that a theory has to be formulated Ãa˘ la (1) in order to be
considered a spacetime theory. There are, for example, cases of spacetime theories formulated in
Lagragian terms, which cannot be cast in the form (1). However, we do not have to mind this for
the present purposes.
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committed to the existence of fields, which, as we have seen, are further divided
into geometric (e.g. metric tensor field) and material (e.g. the electromagnetic
field). This “doubly dualistic” metaphysical stance involving mixed particle/field
and geometry/matter commitments is of course naive and perfectible. However,
the disagreeing reader can just take it as a mere choice of vocabulary, and still
follow the conceptual analysis of background structures we are going to perform.
A key motivation to adopt a naive realist attitude towards O is that, by doing so,
we have a more or less clear measure of how much structure a spacetime the-
ory postulates. By claiming this, we accept the line of argument developed in
North (2009), where it is argued that modern physical theories represent objective
physical structures in terms of geometric field-theoretic objects. Hence, roughly
speaking, the larger O, the more structure is postulated by T .
So far we have agreed to adopt, as a working hypothesis, a naively realistic atti-
tude towards the geometrical objects O in (1), but this claim by itself is confusing:
to what specific theory are we declaring our commitments? The answer is to all
the theories falling in the scope of definition 1, and this is our second working hy-
pothesis. In order to better spell out this second assumption, we need to introduce
another important definition:
Definition 2. (Model) A model of a spacetime theory T is a (k + 1)-tuple
< M, {Ok}k∈N > - where Oi ∈ O for all i ≤ k - that is a solution of E.
If we think of the space QT whose points represent each a configuration of all
the geometrical objects of the theory - which is in fact called configuration space
of the theory - then E selects a subspace ST ⊂ QT comprising all the physically
allowed configurations of geometrical objects. This is at the root of the usual dis-
tinction between a purely kinematical state of affairs, that is, whatever element of
QT , and a physical (or dynamical) state, which belongs to ST .
Definition 2 concerns “total” or “cosmological” models, which means that, in a
model < M, {On} >, the geometrical objects are spread throughout the entire man-
ifold M. However, it might be the case that a model admits a subclass of “partial”
models involving a submanifold K ⊂ M and a set of geometrical objects defined
on it.
The concept of model is the most important one for interpretational purposes be-
cause, from a metaphysical point of view, a model of a theory represents a physi-
cally allowed state of affairs. According to our realist attitude, then, a cosmologi-
cal model of a given theory T will represent an entire universe where the specific
laws of T hold. In other words, it represents a nomically possible world. By the
same token, a submodel of the same theory will be interpreted as a possible local
states of affairs in a nomically possible world. In order to make the philosophical
analysis easier, we will consider all and only the models of spacetime theories
satisfying (1) and we will assume that this set of models represents a cluster of
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nomically possible situations. Each theory, then, individuates a subset of possi-
ble worlds where the particular laws E of that theory are at work. Note that this
working hypothesis does not restrict us to adopt a particular metaphysical stance
neither with respect to possible worlds (they can be mental constructions as well
as existent objects), nor with respect to laws of nature (E can be either grounded,
say, in some genuinely modal feature of the entities inhabiting a possible world,
or can be just a description of regularity patterns crafted in that possible world).
The last important definition we need to put forward before digging into meta-
physical considerations regards the notion of general covariance:
Definition 3. (General covariance - Formal version) A spacetime theory T is
generally covariant iff, for all f ∈ di f f (M) and for allM ∈ ST , it is the case that
f (M) ∈ ST . di f f (M) is the covariance group of T .
Here we talk of a “formal” version of general covariance - as opposed to a
“substantive” one, which we will encounter later - for the following reason. Since
E lives on the manifold M, i.e., it represents the way the geometrical objects of
the theory are related throughout the manifold, and since di f f (M) is the group
of the structure preserving mappings defined over M, then it is trivial to see that,
by applying a diffeomorphism to whatever model of the theory, we obtain another
model of the theory. Moreover, given that formal general covariance is trivially
satisfied by any theory falling in the scope of definition 1, and given that it is pos-
sible to formulate extremely different physical theories in the form (1) - just think
about the physical abyss that lies between NM and GR -, then it is clear that the
notion of general covariance defined above is purely formal and bears no physical
import (historically, Kretschmann, 1917, was the first to acknowledge this fact).
A legitimate question might arise at this point. Given that radically different
spacetime theories can be encompassed by the same formal framework, what is it
exactly that makes them in fact radically different? To give a precise answer to this
question, we need to say something more about the metaphysics of backgrounds.
3 A Metaphysical Appraisal of Backgrounds
The notion of background structure we are going to introduce draws from the
work of Anderson (1964, 1967),4 and is based on the distinction made among the
elements of O between dynamical and non-dynamical objects. Such a distinction
will become clearer in a moment. For the time being, let us just say that a back-
ground structure B ∈ O is a geometrical object of the theory that is fixed ab initio
and, hence, is “persistent” throughout the solution space of the theory.
4Further refined in Friedman (1983, see in particular chapter II, sections 2 and 3).
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To inform this notion with physics, consider the special relativistic description of
the propagation of a massless scalar field:
ηφ = 0, (2)
where η is the d’Alembertian operator with components ηi j ∂∂xi
∂
∂x j in some co-
ordinate system.5 Let us further assume that (2) has two solutions φ1 and φ2.
According to our metaphysical hypotheses, this means that the SR-cluster admits
two possible worlds that are described by the models < η,φ1 > and < η,φ2 >.
It is obvious to claim that these two worlds share a single feature, namely, the
Minkowski metric. The key point is that we can repeat this operation with any
two special relativistic worlds, that is, if we inspect the entire space of models
of SR, we see that all the models of the theory feature η. From our metaphys-
ical perspective, this translates to the fact that, in all possible worlds belonging
to the SR-cluster, there always exists a Minkowski spacetime. Generalizing, we
can think of characterizing a background structure by means of its metaphysi-
cal necessity or, better, its nomic necessity: a background structure B of a given
spacetime theory T is an object that such a theory deems necessary, i.e., there are
no possible worlds described by T where B does not exist.
Along with this first metaphysical feature of background structures comes a clear
reason to feel uncomfortable with background dependent theories. A theory that
postulates a necessary physical structure is conceptually puzzling, not least be-
cause it tells us that there is just one physical possibility among many conceivable
ones. By the same token, taking a structure as nomically necessary entails that it
is physically impossible for it to change although we can conceive of a process
in which the structure under scrutiny might in fact change. From an epistemic
perspective, we can say that, when a theory accords a nomically necessary status
to a spatiotemporal structure B, then it is unable to provide a physically justified
answer to the question “why is it B and not otherwise?”. In the case of SR, the
theory tells us that the only physically possible spacetime is the Minkowski one,
and the only answer this theory can provide to the question “why is it not other-
wise?” is “because it is how it is”. Some may object that there is nothing really
conceptually puzzling here, since it is totally reasonable to expect that the chain
of physical justifications provided by a theory stops somewhere - i.e. there always
comes a point in which a theory can just answer “because it is how it is”. This
is fair enough. However, this does not prevent us from putting two claims on the
table. The first is: the fewer objects in O a theory deems nomically necessary, the
better. This is because, then, such a theory is likely to exhibit a deeper explanatory
structure than other spacetime theories that are more metaphysically “rigid”. For
example, GR is better than SR with this regard because it explains why and under
5The Einstein convention is applied here.
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what circumstances spacetime has a Minkowskian structure. Of course, this claim
is not sacrosanct, in the sense that surely some counter-examples can be mounted
against it. However, it still is fairly reasonable if applied to the major spacetime
theories we have so far. The second claim we want to highlight is: it is not im-
possible that a theory falling in the scope of definition 1 does not commit us to
the nomic necessity of any of the objects in O. Clearly, this second claim does not
entail that such a theory admits a bottomless structure of physical justification -
although many philosophers would not find anything wrong with that -, but just
that the theory fixes ab initio some features other than (full) spatiotemporal struc-
tures.
A second important metaphysical feature of spatiotemporal backgrounds comes
from the following example. Let us focus on the Newtonian cluster of possible
worlds, and consider a Newtonian world where there exist a large ship docked on
a calm sea. Inside the ship, shut up in the main cabin below decks, there is a man
- we can call him Salviati - together with an experimental equipment consisting
of jars of flies, fishes in bowls and dripping bottles.6 Simply speaking, we are
dealing with a global modelM, which describes the possible world in its entirety,
but we are magnifying just a portion of it, that is a submodel m describing just
what happens in the immediate surroundings of the ship. Let us now apply to m a
transformation f that consists in a rigid spatial translation of the ship. The model
f ∗m will then depict a situation in which the ship is still on a calm sea without
wind, but now it is located, say, one meter away from the position it had in m.
In what dynamical aspects does m and f ∗m differ? None: in both cases the ship
is at absolute rest and Salviati is unable to spot any difference by looking at the
equipment on board. This reasoning can be repeated with rotations. Take f as a
45 rotation of the ship with respect to the original orientation, and again both m
and f ∗m will depict a ship at absolute rest, where Salviati’s equipment behaves
exactly in the same manner as the non-rotated one. We then suspect that the no-
tion of sameness for Newtonian states of affairs is influenced by the underlying
background structures. In this case, since Euclidean space is homogeneous and
isotropic, the state of absolute rest of the ship is insensitive to where the ship is
placed or how it is oriented.
As an acid test, consider another situation where f ∗m makes Salviati’s ship sail-
ing over troubled waters. In this case, it is quite obvious that m and f ∗m depict
radically different dynamical situations. The ship in f ∗m is not in a state of ab-
solute rest (its worldline is not a geodesic at all, let alone a straight line pointing
in the privileged “rest direction”), and this has quite disruptive observable conse-
quences: while in m Salviati sits down quietly observing his jars of flies, fishes in
6Here, of course, we are referring to the “Gran Naviglio” thought experiment in Galilei (1632).
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bowls and dripping bottles, in f ∗m he7 is shaking in the main cabin among broken
glasses, buzzing flies and asphyxiating fishes.
To sum up, we have individuated another very important metaphysical aspect
of backgrounds, namely, that they fix a notion of sameness of dynamical state
throughout the cluster of possible worlds of the theories they figure into. From
a formal perspective, this means that, if a spacetime theory admits a set of back-
ground structures {Bi}, then for whatever two models of the theory related by
some transformation f , these two models are said to be dynamically indiscernible
iff f ∗Bi = Bi, for all i, that is, iff f is a transformation (called isometry) that
leaves all the background structures invariant. We call this set of isometries
iso({Bi}) ⊂ di f f (M) the symmetry group of the theory.
This definition of symmetry qualifies as “ontic” in the taxonomy put forward in
Dasgupta (2015). The author charges this kind of definition with inferential cir-
cularity. In his own words:
But according to an ontic definition of ‘symmetry’, in order to check
whether a given transformation [ f ] counts as a symmetry of [dynam-
ical] laws, I first need to know which physical features fix the data
so that I can check whether [ f ] preserves them. And the problem is
that, in many cases, we discover which physical features fix the data
by engaging in symmetry-to-reality reasoning!
(Ibid, p. 28)
Although the above issue is a serious one, worth of extensive philosophical dis-
cussion, here we just dodge the charge of inferential circularity by appealing to
our naive realist framework. Simply speaking, we do not discover which physical
features “fix the data” (in our case, the background structures): we just postulate
them ab initio.
At this point, we can go back to the question raised at the end of the previous
section, that is, what is it that renders different spacetime theories in fact differ-
ent? The answer is now crystal clear: the background structures in O. It is in fact
thanks to the backgrounds postulated by a theory that we can attribute physical
import to a subset of the covariance group di f f (M). We have then different the-
ories depending on the subset individuated by the backgrounds. For example, we
can say that NM is physically different from SR because the former admits a set
of symmetries which form a group called Galilean, while the symmetries of the
latter belong to the Poincaré group.
However, as in the previous case, also this feature of backgrounds may lead to un-
happy consequences. To see this let us consider again the docked ship on a calm
7Or, if you want, his counterpart, depending on the particular account of possible worlds
adopted.
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sea in m, and transform this model in one where the ship is still on a calm sea, but
now it is sailing with uniform velocity. Technically, the transformation f involved
in this case belongs to the so-called Galilean group. Intuitively speaking, while in
m the ship is in a trajectory of absolute rest (straight line pointing in the privileged
direction), f just “inclines” the trajectory of an arbitrary angle without “bending”
it. We are now in a strange situation: from the global perspective ofM,m and f ∗m
depict different dynamical states - absolute rest vs. motion with uniform absolute
velocity, but from Salviati’s perspective, there is no empirically observable differ-
ence between the two dynamical states! Here, as in the case of nomic necessity, a
liberal metaphysician might claim that we should not worry too much and just ac-
cept the fact that our theory commits us to the existence of dynamically different
yet empirically indistinguishable states of affairs. After all, this is just a metaphys-
ical fact that does not impair in any way the role of physicists. In fact, it is obvious
that whatever empirical question regarding the dynamics that Salviati could ask
would always have an answer, which would be the same irrespective of the fact
that the ship is in a state of absolute rest or absolute uniform motion. Again, we
concede the point that the existence of dynamically distinct yet empirically indis-
tinguishable states of affairs is not a mortal sin for a theory. But accepting this
means accepting that there can be elements of reality that are totally opaque to
physics! This is a rather embarrassing claim to embrace, especially if we believe
that metaphysics must be motivated and informed by science (and physics in par-
ticular). At least, it is reasonable to invoke some sort of Occamist norm according
to which, among two competing theories with the same empirical consequences,
we should prefer the one that commits us to the least structure. Let us try to apply
such a norm to NM.
The evidence that the culprit for the above discussed unwanted situation is abso-
lute space is given by the fact that the Galilean group is part of the isometries of all
Newtonian background objects except for the class of straight lines that fixes the
notion of “sameness of place through time”. Fortunately, we can reformulate NM
without privileging any set of geodesics and, hence, giving up the commitment to
absolute space.8 In this new framework this particular problem evaporates since
now the dynamics of the theory does not distinguish anymore states of rest from
states of uniform velocity.
In sum, here lies the second charge against background structures: the more back-
ground structures a theory admits, the more it is likely that the theory will consider
as dynamically distinct some models that, in fact, admit the very same physical
observables.
The last metaphysical feature of a background structure is related to the distinction
between dynamical and non-dynamical objects mentioned at the beginning of the
8As shown, for example, in Friedman (1983, Chapter III, section 2).
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section. In short, spatiotemporal backgrounds are non-dynamical objects because
they do not enter E as elements subjected to the dynamical laws but, rather, they
represent the support that renders possible the very formulation of such laws. The
problem with the non-dynamicity of background structures is summarized in the
following quote:
[A]n absolute element in a theory indicates a lack of reciprocity; it
can influence the physical behavior of the system but cannot, in turn,
be influenced by this behavior. This lack of reciprocity seems to be
fundamentally unreasonable and unsatisfactory. We may express the
converse in what might be called a general principle of reciprocity:
Each element of a physical theory is influenced by every other ele-
ment. In accordance with this principle, a satisfactory theory should
have no absolute elements.
(Anderson, 1964, p. 192)
Anderson effectively summarizes the third peculiarity of backgrounds and the rea-
son why we should feel uneasy about that. However, few comments are in place.
First of all, the way Anderson enunciates the principle of reciprocity is too strong
and seems to amount to some holistic principle which, most likely, was not the
author’s intention. Perhaps it would have been better to say that each element of a
physical theory can be influenced by some other element. Secondly, the principle
as it stands can be easily challenged on the ground of its vagueness as to how an
“element of a physical theory” has to be understood. To see why it is so, we could
just consider the Lagrangian formulation of NM. In this framework, the behavior
of a mechanical system is fully described by the Lagrange equations: once we
fix an appropriate Lagrangian plus initial conditions, we get the full dynamical
history of the system in the form of a trajectory in configuration space. In a sense,
then, the Lagrangian function is an element of the theory that influences the me-
chanical system but that is not influenced back, being it a supporting element of
the dynamical description. Does it imply that the Lagrangian violates the princi-
ple of reciprocity? Here, we are exploiting the vagueness underlying the notion of
“element of a physical theory”. The Lagrangian is with no doubt an element of the
theory, but it would be awkward to interpret it as ontologically on a par with the
mechanical system: it is just a descriptive tool that carries dynamical information
and, as such, has not to be taken as referring to a concrete object that exists over
and above the mechanical system. Evidently, a too broad characterization of an
element of the theory led us to a category mistake.
Fortunately, the theoretical framework given by definitions 1 and 2 helps us clar-
ifying the real intentions behind Anderson’s quote above. If, in fact, we restrict
the scope of the principle of reciprocity to the geometrical objects definable over
M, we can restate the principle as follows: each element of the set O must be
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subjected to the dynamical evolution encoded by E. This renders the principle of
reciprocity less vague and highlights in what sense Anderson characterizes back-
ground structures as elements of the theory that violate such a principle. However,
we still have the possibility to scupper this characterization. To do so, it is suf-
ficient to reconsider the example of the theory with equation (2). As we have
seen, this theory features a background structure, namely the Minkowski metric
η. Now, let us add to (2) a further equation:
Riem[g] = 0. (3)
What have we done here? Leaving aside technical considerations, we have done
nothing but “embedding” the fixing condition of the Minkowski metric into E.
Hence, the solution space of this new theory carries absolutely no more physi-
cal information than the one associated to (2) alone, and the Minkowski metric
is still a background structure satisfying the first two features we have reported.
However, now, we have a theory that challenges the utility of the principle of
reciprocity as a guide in assessing spacetime theories. In the theory (2)/(3) each
element of the set O is subjected to the dynamical evolution encoded by E, but
still the theory admits a background. This example shows that even the amended
version of the principle of reciprocity we have considered is conceptually flawed.
Nonetheless, it seems still evident that Anderson’s quotation captures a salient fea-
ture of backgrounds. Perhaps, we should read this quote in a more straightforward
way, and interpret the talk in term of influences as referring to a very concrete no-
tion of physical interaction. In some sense, here we are shifting the problem to
what exactly “interacting” amounts to in the modern physical jargon. However,
just for the sake of argument, let us assume that an interaction between two ele-
ments Θ1 and Θ2 of a theory amounts to adding to E a coupling relation of the
form F(Θ1,Θ2, κ), κ being and appropriate coupling parameter. If we reconsider
the principle of reciprocity under this light, than it becomes the statement that
each field-theoretic object is coupled with some other. The challenge of the the-
ory (2)/(3) is now defused because the background role of the Minkowski metric
is restored due to the fact that it does not satisfy this latter version of the princi-
ple of reciprocity. Therefore, in the end, we can say that the third metaphysical
feature of spatiotemporal background is the one already highlighted by Newton’s
quotation at the beginning of the paper, namely that they bear their properties
without relation to anything else: this feature can be reasonably translated in the
language of modern spacetime physics as the fact that they are structures that are
not coupled to any material field.
Is this a bad thing, metaphysically speaking? Let us answer with the words of
Brown and Lehmkuhl:
If there is a questionable aspect of [the principle of reciprocity], it
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is less the claim that substances act (how otherwise could their exis-
tence be known to us?) than the notion that they are necessarily acted
back upon, that action must be reciprocal. If all substances act, they
do so in relation to other substances; these other substances therefore
cannot be immune from external influences. Now it might seem ar-
bitrary on a priori grounds to imagine that the ‘sensitivity’ of such
substances is not universal. That is to say, it might seem arbitrary to
suppose that not all substances react to others. But no such abstract
qualms can be entirely compelling; Nature must have the last say.
(Brown and Lehmkuhl, 2015, pp. 3, 4)
Otherwise said, pursuing the principle of reciprocity is reasonable but not neces-
sary. To further reflect on this point, let us focus on NM and ask in what sense the
absolute backgrounds of this theory influence the motion of bodies. For example,
what is it that “forces” an isolated point-particle to move in a straight line? The
answer is obviously “nothing”, let alone absolute structures: it is just a primitive
fact - i.e. non further justifiable via a “why” question - that in every Newtonian
world there exists a privileged class of trajectories occupied by bodies in iner-
tial motion. In this sense, absolute structures define possible motions but do not
push (in a ordinary physical sense) bodies to move that way. Under this light, it
does not seems that conceptually hard to withstand a violation of the principle of
reciprocity.
4 Conclusion: How Easily Can We Dispense with
Backgrounds?
In the previous section we have supplied a metaphysical characterization of spa-
tiotemporal backgrounds based on the language of modern spacetime physics. To
recap, we have highlighted three features of background structures in a spacetime
theory:
1. The theory in which they feature treats them as (nomically) necessary struc-
tures.
2. They induce a notion of dynamical sameness among states of affairs through-
out the solution space of the theory.
3. Their dynamical influences are not describable as physical interactions.
As we have discussed, with each of this metaphysical traits comes an associated
conceptual discomfort. However, we have also highlighted that none of these is-
sues lead to contradictions or physical loopholes. Hence, we are inclined to claim
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that whether one wants to renounce background structures depends on one’s own
metaphysical tastes. Otherwise said, one can backup one’s commitment to back-
ground independence with strong and convincing arguments (and, indeed, many
of such arguments can be found in the literature), but she cannot appeal to a re-
quirement of background independence as a physically necessary one.
However, the realist framework we have put forward has made clear that back-
ground structures have not only (mild) metaphysical vices, but also metaphysical
virtues. The most important among them is the possibility to straightforwardly
define the notion of physical symmetry in an ontic manner, without incurring in-
ferential circularity. More generally, once we specify what are the background
structures {Bi} of a theory, the interpretation of such a theory becomes a rather
smooth business: this is because, once the symmetries of a theory are given, we
can identify as referring to real objects or properties those theoretical structures
that are invariant under these symmetries. Once again, we stress that this is pos-
sible because we assume background structures as postulated ab initio as a matter
of ontological fact. In general, in fact, there is no formal criterion that makes an
object in O a background structure, and it can be the case that the very same ge-
ometric object can count or not count as background depending on the particular
interpretation of the theory chosen (Belot, 2011, section 3.3, discusses in detail
the case of such geometrically ambiguous theories).
So far we have engaged in a conceptual cost-benefit analysis of postulating back-
ground structures in our theory. Suppose, now, that we are inclined to buy into the
view that a background has more costs than benefits and, hence, we wish to go
for background independence. According to our framework, implementing such
a requirement amounts - at least - to constructing a theory whose spatiotemporal
structures do not satisfy the three conditions listed at the beginning of the section.
Here, obviously, we cannot undertake this task, so we will be just content to verify
whether GR, which is usually considered the epitome of background independent
theory, in fact violates the three metaphysical requirements for background struc-
tures.
The dynamical equations of GR have the form G[g] = κT[φ, g], where the left-
hand side of the relation represents the geometry of spacetime (the so-called Ein-
stein tensor), and the right hand side features the stress-energy tensor, which en-
codes information regarding the mass-energy distribution over a region of space-
time. We can then say that spacetime in GR is not a background in primis because
the theory is about the coupling of the metric field g with the matter field(s) φ and,
hence, the third requirement above is not met. From the form of the dynamical
equations, in the second place, we infer that it is not the case that all the models
of the theory feature the same geometric objects and, hence, in the GR-cluster of
possible worlds there is no field-theoretic structure that counts as nomically neces-
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sary.9 It seems, then, that also the second condition is not fulfilled. As a matter of
fact, as we have hinted at in section 3, there are other features of the models of the
theory that bear a physical significance and that show the “persistence” typical of
backgrounds. For example, all models of GR feature manifolds of dimensionality
4 and Lorentzian in nature. Hence, although GR does not treat any spatiotempo-
ral structure as nomically necessary, there are some characteristic traits of these
structures that are nonetheless preserved throughout the solution space of the the-
ory. Hence, strictly speaking, in GR the spatiotemporal structures do bear at least
some properties without relation to anything external.
To get rid once and for all of this kind of objections, we can somehow render our
distinction between background dependent and independent theories more flex-
ible. Up to now, in fact, we have assumed that, in order to consider a theory
background dependent, it is sufficient that it admits at least a background struc-
ture. However, this sort of classification might be too coarse or might deliver
an unintuitive picture. Consider for example a theory whose equations have two
classes of models: one featuring, say, a flat metric, and another featuring a curved
one. Clearly, these two metrics would not qualify as backgrounds according to the
above characterization, since they are not nomically necessary objects according
to the theory. Still, we would feel unconfortable with this conclusion, since such
a theory would still be “ontologically rigid”. Perhaps, we can establish a well-
defined way to count (i) how many physical features in general - not only geomet-
ric objects in O - are deemed nomically necessary by the theory and (ii) how often
non-nomically necessary features appear throughout the solution space of the the-
ory. This would imply that the distinction between background dependence and
independence would not be so clear-cut, there being different degrees in which
they come. If this strategy can be consistently worked out (Belot, 2011, makes
a concrete proposal along these lines), then we would have a measure according
to which, say, NM is fully background dependent, while GR is fully background
independent modulo minor fixed features.
Finally, let us consider the second requirement and ask, if GR has no background
structures, does it still possess a well-behaved notion of dynamical sameness? We
face a dilemma here: if we answer no, this would imply that GR is a useless the-
ory incapable of making even the simplest empirical predictions, which is most
obviously not the case; if we answer yes, then we have to face a huge contro-
versy. To see why it is so, let us back up our affirmative answer with the following
argument:
(P1) The physical symmetries of a spacetime theory are those transformations
9As a matter of fact, some examples might be provided, which challenge this claim (see, e.g.,
Pitts, 2006). However, since these examples are not disruptive to our analysis, we can set them
aside.
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f ∈ di f f (M) that are isometries for the background structures {Bi};
(P2) GR has no background structures, i.e. {Bi} = ∅;
Therefore,
(C) In GR, all transformations f ∈ di f f (M) are physical symmetries of the
theory.
The conclusion of this argument is usually stated as the fact that GR satisfies the
requirement of substantive general covariance, as opposed to the mere formal ver-
sion given by definition 3. Note that a similar argument can be mounted, in which
(P2) and (C) are switched. In this way, background independence and substan-
tive general covariance would become overlapping concepts. The problem with
this line of argument is that it forces us to buy into the view that, trivially, the
transformations in di f f (M) are all at once isometries of no background structure
(whatever diffeomorphism applied to nothing does not change anything). But that
seems too loose an appeal because the distinction between the whole di f f (M)
and iso({Bi}) requires background structures: if such structures are absent, then
we have no means for making the distinction. By the same token, starting from the
premise that all diffeomorphisms are physical symmetries of the theory does not
provide a firm enough ground to infer that the theory is background independent,
since we can always disguise background structures as dynamical objects.
Hence, it seems clear that, in order to define substantive general covariance in a
more rigorous way, it is necessary to base the argument for having di f f (M) as
the set of physical symmetries on an approach different from the one considered
in this paper. Earman (2006), for example, analyzes substantive general covari-
ance in terms of variational symmetries in the Lagrangian formalism, but this ap-
proach does not help with spacetime theories that cannot be rendered in Lagragian
terms.10 Stachel (1986), instead, argues that the problem arises from a wrong way
of looking at the structure of spacetime theories. Very simply speaking, Stachel
claims that the physically relevant information regarding a spacetime theory is not
in general encoded in the manifold M, but in a more complex structure, namely,
a triple of topological spaces - technically called fiber bundle - (X, M,F ), with X
having locally the form M × F . In this context, the dynamical equations E be-
come a set of rules for selecting cross-sections of this fiber bundle.11 Now, the
requirement of substantive general covariance amounts to the fact that all the (ge-
ometrical objects referring to) spatiotemporal structures of the theory live on these
cross-sections. If some structure still lives on the manifold M, then the theory is
10See Pooley (2010) for a detailed criticism of Earman’s proposal.
11Intuitively, if the fiber bundle is a simple vector bundle, then a cross-section of it would be a
vector field over M.
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background dependent.
Stachel’s approach might prove more effective than that represented by (1) in
highlighting the formal differences between spacetime theories - especially with
respect to considerations regarding background dependence/independence. How-
ever, it does not seem to bring much ontological clarity to the matter. While, in
fact, the framework we put forward admits a straightforward interpretation, it is
not at all clear how to spell out the way the structure (X, M,F ) refers to real (or
possible) physical structures.
In conclusion, the most important moral we can draw from the analysis devel-
oped in this paper is that background structures, albeit showing some metaphys-
ical vices, are nonetheless elements that render the formulation and the interpre-
tation of a spacetime theory sharp and fairly simple. This is why pursuing the
requirement of background independence demands a huge conceptual price to be
paid.
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